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ABSTRACT 
 The Department of Defense (DoD) periodically conducts a Base Realignment and 
Closure (BRAC) round to improve the stationing of its force structure, eliminate excess 
infrastructure, and attain cost savings. The most recent BRAC round in 2005 far 
exceeded its estimated  cost to implement;  in a 2012 report, the Government 
Accountability Office reported that the 2005 BRAC implementation cost grew from the 
original estimate by 67%. The DoD requires an improved cost estimate and 
understanding of inherent uncertainty. Using data from 58 observations of BRAC 2005 
recommendations, this thesis examines trends in cost growth. The thesis does not find 
any statistically significant differences in cost increases among subsets of data analyzed 
by type of DoD recommending agency, presence of Commission amendments, BRAC 
action complexity, or size of estimate. Variation in implementation cost growth is mildly 
narrower for BRAC actions that were amended by the Commission and for actions that 
were more complex. The analysis detects a bias in estimating large BRAC actions, which 
indicates a systematic hesitancy or inability to fully estimate the most expensive BRAC 
actions. The distribution of BRAC 2005 actions’ cost increases is used to inform an 
improved, three-point estimate for future BRAC rounds. Under conditions comparable to 
BRAC 2005, this thesis shows that the true mean of future BRAC actions’ cost increases 
may be expected to be 93% with a 95% confidence interval of [57%, 129%]. 
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The Department of Defense (DoD) periodically conducts a round of Base 
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) to improve the stationing of its force structure, eliminate 
excess infrastructure, and attain cost savings. The latest BRAC round in 2005 far exceeded 
its estimated cost to implement. The Government Accountability Office (2012) reports that 
the implementation cost grew from the original estimate of $21 billion to $35.1 billion, a 
67% cost increase. BRAC cost estimates are historically limited to point estimates. This 
thesis delivers a better understanding of the sources of cost growth and the inherent 
uncertainty in BRAC implementation cost estimates. 
This thesis studies 58 observations of 2005 BRAC Commission recommendations. 
The selected BRAC actions may reasonably be expected to resemble a future BRAC round. 
The majority of the BRAC actions, 43 of 58 actions, grew to cost more than anticipated. 
We identify military construction as the primary driver of cost increases. Operations and 
maintenance costs are also significant. Other costs such as Homeowners Assistance 
Program (HAP), environmental, and military personnel costs are not a significant source 
of cost growth in BRAC 2005 implementation cost.  
The thesis explores the data to determine if subsets of the data experience 
significantly different cost growth; for such subsets, this may justify applying distinct 
inflation factors on the estimates in order to improve the accuracy of cost estimates. We 
look for differences in cost increases among the data according to the type of DoD 
recommending agency, amendments imposed by the BRAC Commission, complexity of 
BRAC actions, and the size of the cost estimate. We find no statistically significant 
differences in cost increases among subsets. 
Conspicuously, the analysis detects a bias in the estimation of large BRAC actions. 
BRAC actions that ultimately are the costliest to implement also experience comparatively 
greater cost increases. This is not detectable at the time of estimation but appears upon 
implementation when final costs are realized. Figure 1 shows the marked gap in cost 
increases between the less costly half of BRAC actions and the costlier half of BRAC 
xvi 
actions. This finding suggests that there is a hesitancy or inability to fully estimate the 
costliest BRAC actions. 
 
Figure 1. Variation in Implementation Cost Increases for 
Lower versus Higher Selected BRAC 2005 Implementation Costs 
In the absence of suitable cost inflation factors for subsets of the data, the thesis 
analyzes the distribution of cost increases itself. The distribution informs an improved, 
three-point estimate for future BRAC rounds. We find with 95% confidence that the true 
mean of BRAC action implementation cost increases is between a 57.4% and 128.8% 
increase, with an expected mean of 93.1%. The distribution likewise informs a cumulative 
distribution function, “S-Curve,” which may be used by BRAC planners and decision 
makers to understand the full range and likelihood of potential cost overruns. Though this 
thesis uses data from 2005 BRAC to draw its conclusions, the inferences drawn are 
applicable to future BRAC rounds to the extent that future BRAC rounds are estimated and 
executed in a comparable way.  
Further analysis of uncertainty in BRAC implementation cost growth will be 
bolstered by improved data quality. The current practice of bundling several base 
realignment and closures under one aggregated recommendation weakens visibility into 
the sources of costs and savings. The Government Accountability Office outlines excellent 
xvii 
steps to achieve better data quality in their March 2013 report entitled, “Opportunities Exist 
to Improve Future BRAC Rounds.”  
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The United States actively manages how its defense forces are stationed in order to 
keep pace with evolving strategic needs. Accordingly, the Department of Defense (DoD) 
periodically adjusts the stationing of its force structure through a formal process. This 
process is referred to as a round of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), wherein a large 
set of recommended stationing adjustments are implemented simultaneously.  
These stationing adjustments are primarily made to increase the military value of 
the DoD’s force structure. However, a secondary objective is to attain cost savings and 
reduce excess infrastructure. This secondary objective remains an important consideration 
when weighing different realignment recommendations, especially where military values 
are comparable.  
Each time a round of BRAC actions is executed, the government incurs a one-time 
cost in order to implement the force structure changes. This upfront cost is a necessary 
investment in order to reap the increased military value or eventual cost savings that are 
expected to result from the BRAC round. The DoD is responsible for providing Congress 
with an estimate of the implementation cost, and Congress then uses this estimate to 
appropriate funds to pay for the BRAC round. 
Historically, there has been significant growth from the estimate to the actual cost 
of the implementation. The most recent BRAC round, executed in 2005, was the largest, 
most complex, and costliest stationing adjustment to occur in recent history (Government 
Accountability Office [GAO] 2012a). It cost much more than the DoD anticipated. The 
cost to implement BRAC 2005 was originally estimated to be $21 billion; this amount 
increased by $14.1 billion, or 67 percent, reaching a final cost of $35.1 billion (GAO 
2012a). The GAO considers the 2005 BRAC to be successful in achieving its military value 
objective (GAO 2005). However, the significant growth in implementation cost is not 
clearly understood, nor is there a common understanding on what level of cost growth may 
be expected in future BRAC rounds.  
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The DoD requires a better estimate of the implementation cost of BRAC rounds. 
The DoD must provide Congress with an accurate cost estimate so that Congress may 
suitably appropriate funds. An accurate implementation cost estimate also supports the 
secondary objective of stationing adjustments, which is to attain cost savings, by providing 
reliable information to models and decision makers. The total cost savings attained in a 
BRAC round is the net sum of the implementation cost and recurring costs (or savings) 
once the BRAC round is implemented. Total cost savings is an important reason that 
stationing adjustments are executed in the first place. If the implementation cost estimate 
lacks accuracy, then the total cost savings estimate may also be expected to lack accuracy. 
This poses a problem for decision makers because the expected total cost savings, which 
forms a basis for decisions regarding the stationing of the United States force structure, can 
reasonably be expected to lack accuracy and lead to suboptimal decisions. Thus, improving 
a BRAC implementation cost estimate and the understanding of its inherent uncertainty 
may improve decision making.  
Several reports examine the cost growth in BRAC implementation costs. Previous 
work by the GAO determined that the implementation cost increase in BRAC 2005 was 
caused in large part by increases in military construction (GAO 2012a; GAO 2013), 
especially from additional requirements that were added after implementation began and 
that were therefore not captured as inputs in the estimation model (GAO 2013). The Office 
of the Army Assistance Chief of Staff for Installation Management (AACSIM) 
corroborates the GAO findings on military construction in its “Critical Analysis of the 
Army’s BRAC 2005 Processes” report, which also discusses the budgetary impact of 
military construction project delays and how better synchronization efforts may aid in 
identifying military construction requirements earlier and more completely (College 2011).  
BRAC actions have also been the subject of case studies. The GAO and the 
respective military services responsible for recommending BRAC actions have analyzed 
individual BRAC actions of interest, both during implementation and retroactively. For 
example, GAO reported extensively on two supply-related BRAC recommendations 
involving the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), in order to examine the extent of cost 
differences from estimation to implementation and the DLA’s challenges in implementing 
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the recommendations (GAO 2008). During the 2005 BRAC implementation period, DoD 
services and agencies periodically briefed the Vice Chief of Staff on BRAC 
recommendations that were exceeding $100 million in implementation cost and 
specifically reviewed each’s significant concerns such as construction delays and cost 
overruns (GAO 2010). This information is captured in internal, unpublished records and in 
GAO’s subsequent interviews with DoD officials. This valuable body of previous work 
improves the understanding of the challenges encountered during BRAC 2005 and how the 
fidelity of future BRAC implementation cost estimates may be improved.  
This thesis extends the contributions of existing work by quantitatively examining 
if BRAC implementation costs may be better predicted from the collective body of data 
known at the time of estimation. It explores trends in the data to see if different cost 
estimation inflation factors are appropriate for subsets of data in order to achieve better 
cost estimates. The thesis examines variation in cost growth to enhance our understanding 
of the sources of uncertainty in the 2005 BRAC. It confirms the significant factors 
contributing to cost overruns identified in previous reports and quantifies their impact on 
the cost estimate by comparing data of 2005 BRAC implementation cost estimates with 
the actual costs realized upon implementation. Military construction, operations and 
maintenance, and other-category costs are the specific cost categories analyzed. For the 
first time, this thesis illustrates the distribution of BRAC 2005 implementation cost 
increases and quantifies their inherent uncertainty. Ultimately, this information is used to 
recommend a three-point BRAC implementation cost estimate that offers a low-end, 
expected, and high-end cost estimate. This is an improvement from the historical practice 
of a single point estimate for BRAC implementation cost, and it may enable lawmakers 
and senior DoD officials to better anticipate and plan for BRAC implementation costs in 
future rounds.  
A. OVERVIEW OF THE BRAC PROCESS 
A round of base realignment and closures, often referred to simply as a “BRAC,” 
is the mechanism for closing and realigning DoD installations in the United Sates. The 
process of approving and executing BRAC recommendations is legislatively complex. 
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Since 1990, it has been largely governed by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment 
Act of 1990, provided in Title XXIX of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1991 (101st Congress 1990). The DoD has completed five BRAC rounds. The first 
was held in 1988, and four more rounds were conducted since Congress passed the act, in 
1991, 1993, 1995, and most recently, in 2005.  
The BRAC process is politically insulated, which is frequently highlighted as a 
hallmark of the BRAC legislation’s ingenuity (GAO 2005). The process of enacting a 
BRAC round begins with the DoD receiving Congressional approval to authorize a new 
round of BRAC. Each service is generally responsible for its set of recommendations. The 
Army’s 2005 recommendations were informed by a decision-support model called Optimal 
Stationing of Army Forces (OSAF), which uses integer linear programming to prescribe 
an optimal Army stationing plan (Dell et al. 2008). Recommendations involving more than 
one service are historically coordinated by a multi-service working group called a Joint 
Cross-Service Group (JCSG).  
The resulting recommendations are then presented to the Secretary of Defense for 
review. The Secretary of Defense submits the recommendations to an independent BRAC 
commission that is charged with reviewing the recommendations. The BRAC Commission 
may make adjustments to the recommendations. The Secretary of Defense then submits the 
set of BRAC recommendations to the President of the United States for his or her 
acceptance or rejection in its entirety. Once the President has taken action, Congress may 
take final action to reject the entire set of BRAC recommendations. If Congress does not 
take action, the set of BRAC recommendations automatically becomes law and must be 
implemented.  
The DoD then has six years from the date the President forwards the actions to 
Congress to implement the recommendations. The costs that are incurred over the six-year 
implementation period are the one-time costs required to implement the BRAC. 
Collectively, these costs comprise the BRAC round’s implementation cost.  
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B. THE PURPOSE OF THE BRAC 
The DoD routinely reshapes its force structure in order to keep pace with changes 
in strategy, missions, weapons systems, and operations. These periodic adjustments are 
intended to enhance the efficiency of the DoD and are analogous to how a large corporation 
may make changes to its plant infrastructure to respond to changes in product demand or 
technology (Dell et al. 2008, p. 421).  
The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 states that the number one 
priority of a BRAC round is to increase the military value of the DoD’s stationing structure 
(107th Congress 2001, §2913(b)). According to the act, the consideration of military value 
includes the following at a minimum: 
(1) Preservation of training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, 
or air forces to guarantee future availability of such areas to ensure the 
readiness of the Armed Forces.  
(2) Preservation of military installations in the United States as staging areas 
for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions.  
(3) Preservation of military installations throughout a diversity of climate 
and terrain areas in the United States for training purposes.  
(4) The impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness. 
(5) Contingency, mobilization, and future total force requirements at both 
existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.  
(107th Congress 2001, §2913(b)(1)-(5))  
The act’s criteria for military value have been amended several times but with only minor 
modifications (101st Congress 1990; 107th Congress 2001; 108th Congress 2004).  
Other criteria, including the extent and timing of potential costs and savings, are 
also considered. These criteria are of subordinate importance to military value. However, 
the act is required to address them. Specifically, the special considerations for the selection 
criteria of military installations must address at a minimum the following: 
(1) The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the 
number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or 
realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.  
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(2) The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military 
installations.  
(3) The ability of both existing and potential receiving communities’ 
infrastructure to support forces, missions, and personnel.  
(4) The impact of costs related to potential environmental restoration, waste 
management, and environmental compliance activities.  
(107th Congress 2001, §2913(c))  
Military value is paramount. But cost savings is a critical secondary factor for 
decision making that may be used to reach a decision when two actions have comparable 
military value. If two courses of BRAC action achieve the same military value and all other 
special consideration criteria such as community and environmental impact are equal, the 
BRAC Commission is expected to approve the action that provides the larger cost savings. 
C. HOW BRAC COSTS ARE ESTIMATED 
The Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model is “an economic analysis 
model…[that] estimates the costs and savings associated with a proposed base closure or 
realignment action” (Harvey 2005, p. 4). COBRA was designed by the Logistics 
Management Institute (LMI) for the Secretary of Defense’s Commission on Base 
Realignment and Closure (Brown 1989) in order to provide, “cost comparisons of proposed 
base realignment actions using data that was available to Service staffs without extensive 
field studies” (Brown 1989). COBRA has been utilized in every BRAC round since 1989, 
with periodic adaptations. 
COBRA uses a wide-ranging set of inputs to produce deterministic cost estimates 
for a specified BRAC action over a period of twenty years, which includes the 
implementation cost over the six-year implementation period and the recurring cost or 
savings for the remaining fourteen years. COBRA solicits up to hundreds of inputs for a 
BRAC recommendation. Examples of such inputs include the number and type of facilities 
on base, the number and type of employees, and the square footage of new construction, 
among many other inputs. This information is solicited for each military base involved in 
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a particular BRAC action, and individual BRAC actions typically involve more than one 
base.  
COBRA then reports aggregated, estimated costs for each BRAC action in cost 
subcategories. The “Total One-Time Cost Report” in COBRA reports 33 subcategories of 
cost estimates for each BRAC action. Among the 33 subcategories of cost estimates are 
military construction costs, civilian Reduction in Force (RIF) costs, information 
technology costs, freight shipping costs, and mothball costs. COBRA models all one-time 
activities that are required for an action’s implementation to occur within the initial six-
year implementation period, and all recurring costs and savings after the six-year period 
are treated as steady-state. All costs and savings dollar values are reported in constant base-
year dollars. For BRAC 2005, the values are reported in 2005 dollars.  
The chief output produced by COBRA relevant to decision makers is the 
“payback year.” The payback year is the estimated future date when savings generated 
from a BRAC action will have fully paid for the cost of the action itself and net savings 
may begin. If a payback year is never reached within the 20-year time period in the model, 
then COBRA reports a net cost rather than a net savings. The payback year allows the 
COBRA user to compare the economic benefit among different courses of action. For 
example, if two comparable BRAC action scenarios have equal military value, then the one 
with the earlier payback year is considered more economically beneficial than the one with 
a later payback year or no payback year at all. COBRA thus offers a means of comparing 
different BRAC actions for cost effectiveness. 
However, COBRA estimates do not fully estimate BRAC implementation costs. 
For simplicity, some key costs are excluded as inputs or underestimated. COBRA does not 
include estimates for costs and savings that are shifted to other federal agencies or 
operations due to a base closure or realignment because it is “unclear what actions an 
agency might take in response to a BRAC action” (GAO 2007, p. 7). Environmental 
restoration and cleanup costs are omitted from the COBRA model. DoD expressly excludes 
these costs, “on the premise that [environmental] restoration is a liability that the 
department must address regardless of whether a base is kept open or closed” (GAO 2007, 
p. 7). COBRA also systematically underestimates military construction cost estimates 
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because certain factors are not identified as inputs in COBRA. Information technology (IT) 
estimates are similarly underestimated because COBRA does not fully anticipate 
information technology costs, particularly for BRAC actions involving missions or 
locations that are heavily reliant on IT capability (GAO 2013). The exclusion of these 
inputs in COBRA models results in incomplete cost estimates.  
The GAO finds COBRA “to be a reasonable estimator for comparing potential costs 
and savings among candidate alternatives” in BRAC 2005 (GAO 2013). But LMI states 
that COBRA was “not intended for budgetary purposes” (Brown 1989), and the 2005 
version of the Cobra User Manual echoes this. Rather, COBRA is designed “to provide a 
consistent and auditable method of evaluating and comparing different courses of action in 
terms of the resulting economic impacts for those costs and savings measured in the model” 
(Harvey 2005, p. 4).  
Despite its known incompleteness as a BRAC cost estimation tool, COBRA 
estimates are consistently used as the benchmark estimates with which post-BRAC 
implementation and recurring costs are compared. COBRA produces the cost estimates 
that are used by the DoD and BRAC Commission to make decisions on BRAC actions. 
COBRA estimates are also the estimates that are provided to Congress to inform how much 
funding should be allocated in the BRAC account to pay for a BRAC round. Therefore, 
there is good reason to understand the limitations of COBRA cost estimates to support their 
realistic use in future budgetary decisions and to achieve more complete cost estimates. 
D. ARRANGEMENT OF THE THESIS 
The next chapter presents an overview of the existing literature on the BRAC. 
Special attention is paid to reasons for BRAC implementation cost growth, areas of 
uncertainty, and limitations to analysis. Next, the thesis describes the historic data that was 
selected for analysis. Visualizations of cost increases in military construction, operations & 
maintenance, and other-category costs provide further insight. 
The thesis explores the data to see if there are identifiable trends in cost increases. 
Specifically, it explores trends in cost growth by the type of DoD recommending agency, 
the effect of amendments, the degree of BRAC action complexity, and the size of the 
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estimate. The purpose of this exploration is to see if there are differences among cost 
growths that support the application of distinct cost inflation factors in order to achieve 
more accurate cost estimates. The thesis then presents a finding on bias in large BRAC 
action estimates. The finding is not directly applicable to a quantitative improvement for 
cost estimates, but awareness of the bias among BRAC estimators and stakeholders may 
reduce its future impact. 
The distribution of the cost increases among BRAC actions is then used to inform 
a three-point estimate for future BRAC actions using a confidence interval. The distribution 
of BRAC action percent increases for total cost are used to create a cumulative distribution 
function “S-curve” illustrating the likelihood of cost growth for an individual BRAC 
action.  
The thesis concludes with a discussion of the significant findings.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter presents the major findings of existing reports on BRAC 2005 
implementation costs, possible sources of cost increase, and the limitations that may impact 
the quality and extent of analysis. The GAO regularly reports on several aspects of previous 
BRAC rounds. In reporting, the GAO incorporates the observations of senior military 
service BRAC leaders and other DoD officials involved with the BRAC through interviews 
and by reviewing their documents. Military services maintain BRAC records in internal, 
deliberative documents, which are generally not published but are accessed by the GAO 
for the purpose of their reports. The GAO, LMI, and COBRA User Manual have 
specifically addressed limitations of the COBRA model. 
A. BRAC 2005 REPORTED COST INCREASES 
The 2005 BRAC implementation cost was significantly underestimated. GAO 
analysis of DoD’s fiscal year 2011 BRAC-related budget submissions determined that by 
the conclusion of the six-year implementation period in 2011, the implementation cost 
increased by 67% from the estimated implementation cost. The final implementation cost 
totaled $35.1 billion (GAO 2012a), a $14.1 billion increase above the estimated 
implementation cost of $21 billion.  
The GAO analyses of BRAC 2005 capture several salient points. Cost growth was 
concentrated in a small number of BRAC actions. Fourteen of the 175 BRAC actions 
accounted for 72 percent of the cost increase (GAO 2012a). GAO also shows that many of 
the BRAC recommendations experienced extreme cost growth. Five recommendations’ 
implementation costs grew by over 1,000 percent from the BRAC Commission estimates, 
as shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Five 2005 BRAC Actions Increased by over 1,000 Percent. 
Source: GAO (2012a). 
 
 
GAO observes that military construction costs in BRAC 2005 were central to the 
cost growth. Costs related to military construction represented 80% of the additional costs 
that BRAC 2005 incurred after the original estimate. Military construction costs alone 
increased from $13.2 billion estimated by the BRAC Commission to $24.5 billion at the 
conclusion of implementation (GAO 2013). 
B. WHY COSTS INCREASED 
Retroactive reports and analyses completed as the implementation was ongoing 
comment on why the BRAC 2005 implementation cost grew so substantially. The findings 
attribute the 2005 BRAC implementation cost increase to a number of reasons.  
1. Additional Requirements 
Foremost among these reasons, is that the DoD did not fully identify all 
requirements at the time when the cost estimates were produced. Many requirements “were 
added or identified after implementation began” (GAO 2013) and were therefore not 
included in the estimation model.  
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Specifically, additional requirements within military construction had a significant 
impact on implementation cost growth. GAO finds most of the 86 percent of the increase 
in military construction costs was incurred from requirements that were added or identified 
after implementation started (GAO 2013). These are requirements that were added post-
estimate, as the DoD “identified the need for new and renovated facilities to enhance 
capabilities” (GAO 2012b). The GAO lists the realignment of the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency as one substantial example, stating that this single BRAC action, 
“more than doubled from $1.1 billion to $2.6 billion, with military construction accounting 
for nearly $726 million of that increase due to additional supporting facilities the agency 
identified as essential to the mission” (GAO 2012a).  
Other additional requirements contributed to cost growth, albeit less significantly 
than added military construction requirements. Notably, unforeseen information 
technology costs were significant. The GAO finds that implementation costs increased in 
part because the DoD did not fully foresee information technology requirements for 
recommendations whose missions involved considerable reliance on information 
technology (GAO 2013). For instance, the information technology requirement for one 
DLA BRAC recommendation that involved, “software development and the 
synchronization of several existing and evolving information technology requirements,” 
increased from $30.9 to $190 million once its information technology requirements were 
fully defined because at the time when the estimate was produced, “[DoD officials]…did 
not have a good sense of what information system would have to be specially designed and 
what the development of those systems would cost” (GAO 2013). 
2. COBRA Model Systematically Underestimates Costs 
LMI designed the COBRA model as a comparison tool to choose among similar, 
proposed BRAC actions. The COBRA model is limited in its ability to provide a full 
implementation cost estimate because it is only designed to provide a partial estimate of 
costs. Thus, implementation costs rise when certain costs that were intentionally omitted 
in the COBRA estimation are realized later during implementation. Citing the COBRA 
model’s function as a cost comparison tool for candidate recommendations, DoD officials 
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reported to the GAO that some “known requirements, such as furnishings for new 
buildings, were not entered as inputs into COBRA because analysts assumed that those 
requirements would be the same regardless of which scenario was chosen, and therefore 
the costs related to those requirements would not affect the comparison” (GAO 2013, 
p. 30). The Army’s lead BRAC 2005 analyst, Colonel (Retired) William B. Tarantino, 
describes the cost of curbs and parking lots accompanying new buildings as one such cost 
that was intentionally omitted. He estimates 26–30% of the cost increase for new military 
construction projects for office buildings may be attributed to this cost alone 
(Tarantino 2016).  
3. Lack of Requisite Sophistication in the COBRA Model 
Some findings point to the lack of sophistication in the COBRA model’s standard 
factors as a contributor to cost growth. Standard factors are static multipliers used to 
calculate costs, and they are applied universally. However, there are concerns that standard 
factors may not be appropriate for all circumstances and that poor estimates may have 
resulted for unique circumstances. A 2013 report by GAO asserts that “the standard factor 
COBRA uses to calculate cost estimates for information technology may be inaccurate” 
(p. 23). GAO believes that the information technology (IT) standard factor may be outdated 
and ineffectively applied. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) officials state that the 
IT standard factor is applied to all installations equally despite certain installations having 
a greater dependence on that capability than others (GAO 2013). COBRA also uses a linear 
standard factor for IT requirements in its 2005 BRAC estimates. In a related criticism, some 
initial discussion among the community of BRAC analysts suggests that COBRA’s IT cost 
algorithm might consider adopting a step function because that may more closely mirror 
how some IT costs are incurred, than a linear function (Dietrich et al 2015). For example, 
if no more than 250 users are recommended for a single server for optimal mission 
performance, then once 250 users are exceeded, another server is required, whether the 
number of users is 270 or 490. In this instance, a step function would be an improvement 
from a linear application of the IT standard factor.  
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The Army Basing Study (TABS) BRAC 2005 After Action Report voices similar 
skepticism on whether the standard factors involving renovation costs in COBRA are 
appropriate for accurately estimating facility reuse. The study reports, “There was a leap 
of faith that all space was useable and would meet future tenant requirements” (Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Infrastructure Analysis 2006, p. 10). Space that did not 
meet usability expectations was either renovated or replaced with an additional space 
requirement. As BRAC 2005 underwent implementation, it became apparent that more 
renovation or new requirements were needed than originally anticipated. Critics of the 
renovation standard factor believe that the standard factor assumption for usable space is 
overly optimistic and calculates that less space will need to be renovated than in actuality. 
This optimism biases the implementation cost estimate to be lower than would an estimate 
that used a higher standard factor for renovation. 
4. Poor Data Quality 
Several sources report that poor data quality confounded decision making and may 
have been a factor in implementation cost increases. Input data for the COBRA model was 
solicited through data calls from DoD databases, and some of these databases may not have 
been accurate. The TABS BRAC 2005 After Action Report states that “historical 
information regarding facilities, infrastructure and environmental conditions was often 
insufficient or inconsistent” (Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Infrastructure 
Analysis 2006, p. 11). A 2016 GAO report on DoD’s Real Property Assets Database 
(RPAD) determined that, “data from RPAD were neither accurate nor complete” and were 
therefore insufficiently reliable to determine the number, size, and cost of DoD-leased 
assets (GAO 2016a, p. 49). Inaccurate data introduced uncertainty to the BRAC process 
and may have resulted in unanticipated implementation cost increases.  
Although the cumulative effect of inaccurate data on the growth of BRAC 2005’s 
implementation cost is not clear, inaccurate data is documented as leading to cost growth 
in several instances. In one notable occurrence, inaccurate RPAD data negatively impacted 
the DoD’s ability to attain cost savings expected through optimal occupation of leased 
space versus government-owned space during the BRAC 2005 implementation period. 
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Leased space is typically more expensive than government-owned space. As part of 2005 
leasing-related BRAC actions, the DoD planned to vacate 12 million square feet of leased 
facilities. After vacating, the “DoD reoccupied over 1.1 million square feet in leased space 
previously vacated when it implemented the 2005 Base Closure and Realignment 
recommendations,” even though less costly government-owned space was available and 
may have sufficed (GAO 2016a). In this circumstance, decisions to vacate and occupy 
space were informed by inaccurate RPAD data. Poor RPAD data thus impaired decision 
making. This resulted in the loss of expected cost savings with a net effect of BRAC 
implementation cost increase. 
5. Unanticipated Costs Incurred outside the BRAC Account 
A lack of shared understanding of what costs would be accounted for as BRAC 
implementation costs may have also contributed to implementation cost growth. DoD 
management regulation required that some costs incurred by the DoD while mitigating 
implementation challenges be reported to Congress as BRAC costs, even though GAO 
reports that they may have been incurred outside the allowable funding of the BRAC 
account (GAO 2010). Concerning the 2005 BRAC, the DoD had not anticipated that costs 
outside the BRAC account would be counted as BRAC costs, and therefore they were not 
part of the implementation estimate. Examples of BRAC-related costs outside the BRAC 
account that were ultimately accounted for as BRAC costs include those incurred by, 
“moving temporarily into different buildings while construction and renovations are 
completed, referred to as swing space, or accelerating the pace of construction to complete 
permanent facilities by the deadline, potentially incurring additional expenses,” and 
“mitigating some human-capital-related challenges by recruiting new personnel and 
offering financial incentives to civilian employees to relocate” (GAO 2010). When the 
DoD later accounted for BRAC costs in accordance with regulatory requirements, the 
implementation cost grew.  
However, the extent to which implementation cost truly grew due to outside costs 
is further confounded by another aspect. The services within DoD did not have a uniform 
manner for accounting for outside costs as BRAC costs. Services interpreted the regulation 
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independently. GAO finds that outside costs were not consistently reported to Congress 
because services were able to prepare their own BRAC budget justification material and 
did not apply a common method for considering BRAC-related costs (GAO 2010). This 
finding dilutes the power of service-to-service comparisons of implementation cost growth, 
especially concerning the portion of cost growth that was due to outside costs. Despite the 
irregularity in reporting across military services, the ultimate inclusion of outside costs in 
Congressional reporting certainly added to overall implementation costs and are a known 
contributor in the 2005 BRAC implementation cost growth.  
6. Unique Timing and Complexity of BRAC 2005 
The 2005 BRAC implementation period, from 2005 to 2011, occurred during a time 
of rapid change across several domains within the DoD. Multiple variables in flux 
concurrently raised uncertainty. The GAO reports that the timing and complexity of BRAC 
2005 made accurate cost estimates exceptionally abstruse. BRAC 2005 is the largest, 
costliest, and most expensive BRAC round to have been undertaken by the DoD. But 
BRAC 2005 is also the only BRAC round to be implemented “during a time of conflict” 
coupled with “significant increases to the defense budget to support ongoing contingency 
operations” (GAO 2010). A 2010 GAO report describes the environment wherein 
simultaneous DoD initiatives posed challenges for BRAC 2005 planners and supporting 
infrastructure.  
Compounding this challenge, DoD is also implementing other extensive 
worldwide transformation initiatives such as the permanent relocation of 
about 70,000 military personnel to the United States from overseas; 
transformation of the Army’s force structure from an organization based on 
divisions to more rapidly deployable, combat brigade-based units; an 
increase in the active-duty end strength of the Army and Marine Corps by 
92,000 members; and the drawdown of combat forces in Iraq while 
simultaneously increasing the U.S. presence in Afghanistan. (GAO 2010) 
The GAO suggests that ongoing demands in 2005 strained existing resources that 
would have otherwise been directed at improving the fidelity of data or better 
understanding requirements. 
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C. LIMITATIONS TO ANALYSIS EFFORTS 
The GAO describes limitations they encountered in its analysis efforts. 
1. Multiple Bases Bundled into Complex Recommendations 
There is no base-level granularity in the reported cost data. In its report to the 2005 
BRAC Commission, the “DoD bundled multiple closures and realignments into single, 
highly complex recommendations…without itemizing the costs and savings associated 
with each separate major action” (GAO 2013). The DoD’s practice of bundling multiple 
bases into one BRAC action makes it difficult to identify relevant cost growth components. 
This limits visibility on the source of cost changes within complex BRAC 
recommendations that involve many bases. 
2. Implementation Cost Understated Inconsistently 
It is uncertain which BRAC actions’ implementation costs may have been 
understated. As described earlier in the discussion of outside costs, cost accounting was 
inconsistent as to what was considered a true, BRAC-related cost. The GAO reports that 
not all 2005 BRAC-related costs were reported as BRAC costs and that the $35.1 billion 
total implementation cost is “likely somewhat understated” (GAO 2016b, p. 21). Costs 
incurred by military departments while mitigating various BRAC challenges, including 
financial incentives for relocating civilian personnel or renovation and leasing costs of 
BRAC-related swing space, were considered BRAC-related by the GAO. But military 
departments submitted their own budget data and had the flexibility to determine which 
costs they considered to be BRAC-related. This practice “led to inconsistencies in what 
kinds of projects had their costs counted as BRAC implementation costs” (GAO 2016b, 
p. 26). In one example, U.S. Army Forces Command officials funded an estimated $13 
million of BRAC-related expenses to renovate swing space facilities at Ft Bragg, with 
appropriations from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 and the Army’s 
Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization account fund; these additional costs were not 
captured as BRAC implementation costs (GAO 2010).  
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In total, GAO identified at least $110 million in BRAC 2005 implementation costs 
that should have been reported to the DoD but were not (GAO 2016b). The GAO also 
acknowledges that this amount is probably not a full accounting of the understated cost. 
The exact amount of unreported 2005 BRAC-related costs is uncertain, and so is the degree 
to which individual BRAC actions are understated relative to another. Therefore, the GAO 
findings prompts recognition that the reported BRAC implementation costs may have a 
discrepancy from their true implementation cost, and that the exact degree of this 
discrepancy is unknown. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
GAO and military service reports have put forward recommendations on how to 
improve the accuracy and understanding of BRAC implementation costs.  
1. Require Standardized Reporting of All BRAC-Related Costs 
In order to ensure that congressional decision makers have a complete picture of 
incurred BRAC implementation costs, the GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
ensure that all BRAC-related costs be captured and reported to Congress (GAO 2010). 
While this was widely accepted as the intent, strict and specific future guidance will be 
helpful in ensuring this objective is met and will resolve differences in accounting practices 
between services. GAO recommends that the DoD clarify “in guidance what is to be 
included as a BRAC implementation cost” (GAO 2016b). GAO finds that a standardized 
approach will result in a more accurate depiction of BRAC costs across services. 
2. Itemize Costs within a BRAC Recommendation 
In order to address the limited granularity of costs and savings information 
available to BRAC decision makers, the GAO recommends that in future BRAC rounds, 
the “DoD limit the practice of bundling potentially stand-alone realignments or closures 
into single recommendations” (GAO 2013). If bundling multiple major realignment or 
closure actions into one complex recommendation is appropriate, GAO suggests that the 
DoD still “itemize the costs and savings associated with each major discrete action in its 
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report to the BRAC Commission” (GAO 2013, p. 61). Following this recommendation 
prevents the loss of valuable data and makes reports more readily analyzable. 
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III. DATA SELECTION 
The next BRAC round decision makers will naturally want to understand the nature 
of potential implementation cost growth. With this understanding as the framework for 
analysis, the thesis analyzes a subset of data that may be expected to resemble a future 
BRAC round. This chapter describes the existing data on the 2005 BRAC and the selected 
data set which this thesis utilizes for analysis.  
A. USE OF 2005 BRAC ROUND DATA 
Data from BRAC 2005 is the preferable data choice compared to data from earlier 
BRAC rounds in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995. BRAC 2005 is the most recent BRAC round 
and may be expected to most closely resemble the next round of BRAC, and the cost 
estimation practices in the most recent round are most likely to resemble practices in the 
next round. Cost algorithms for the COBRA model have historically been incrementally 
adjusted from the most recent BRAC round’s model. BRAC 2005 also has the most 
complete data available for both estimated and implemented costs. It has the largest number 
of recommended BRAC actions of any BRAC round and thus offers a large amount of 
observations for analysis. The large data set and relative recency of the 2005 BRAC support 
its suitability for analysis.  
1. Observations 
The thesis treats each BRAC recommendation, as it is described by the 2005 
Commission in its final report to the President of the United States, as an observation. This 
treatment is consistent with GAO reporting and enables the findings in this thesis to be 
comparable with GAO findings and relevant to service-internal documents.  
2. Estimated and Implemented Costs 
The selected BRAC 2005 data for this thesis is comprised of two distinct parts: data 
concerning the estimated cost to implement the BRAC round and data concerning the 
actual cost to implement the BRAC round. Broadly, these are referred to as the estimation 
cost data and implementation cost data, respectively. The 2005 estimation data was 
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generated a priori. The implementation data records the implementation costs that were 
incurred at the completion of the six-year implementation period. These two subsets of data 
enable the study of cost growth in implementation cost estimates.  
3. Focus on One-Time Implementation Costs 
This thesis focuses solely on the one-time costs required to implement a BRAC 
round. Recurring costs or savings of BRAC actions are not part of the analysis. 
Implementation costs are analyzed because they are of immediate concern for budgeting 
since they cannot be deferred or postponed. BRAC implementation costs are also 
significant and comprise an important part of understanding the overall extent of DoD cost 
savings through BRAC actions.  
B. SOURCE OF ESTIMATION DATA 
The Department of Defense’s Base Realignment and Closure Office (BRACO) 
provided the BRAC 2005 COBRA models, which are the source for the estimation data. 
COBRA models went through several iterations and modifications throughout the BRAC 
deliberation process. This thesis uses the cost estimates generated in reports from the final 
version of the COBRA models prior to the onset of the implementation period.  
These final COBRA models’ estimates generally align with the estimates presented 
in the BRAC Commission’s report to the President (2005 Defense Base Closure and 
Realignment Commission 2005). Minor differences are explained by adjustments to the 
models that were made after the Commission submitted its report but prior to 
implementation. As is allowable in the standard process, the 2005 BRAC Commission 
made amendments to some BRAC recommendations during the approval process. Of the 
190 DoD recommendations, the Commission approved 119 with no change and accepted 
45 with amendments (2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission 2005).  
After the Commission approved these amendments but before the implementation 
period began, the DoD revised and re-ran some of the more substantively affected COBRA 
models to obtain internal cost estimates that more closely resembled the Commission’s 
final approved BRAC actions. Where applicable, this thesis uses estimation data from these 
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updated COBRA models. This is specifically noted because some BRAC actions’ 
estimated costs in the thesis data differ slightly from the estimates submitted to the 
Commission and which are recorded in the Commission’s final report to the President. The 
Government Accountability Office uses the initial estimates submitted to the Commission 
in their reports. In places where this thesis’s cost estimation data differs from the GAO 
reports, the use of updated COBRA models’ reports are the cause for the difference. The 
latest-available COBRA models prior to implementation onset are used for analysis 
because their cost estimates represent the best available estimate prior to implementation.  
C. SOURCE OF IMPLEMENTATION DATA 
The BRAC Office’s 2005 BRAC “Business Plans,” as of May 2015, provide the 
data for the implementation costs. The Business Plans represent budget quality data that 
tracks the funds obligated for the implementation of BRAC actions from 2005 to 2011, 
during the six-year implementation period.  
They are historic costs, but they have not always been stable. The BRAC Office 
continued to make adjustments to the funds obligated after the implementation period 
ended. In 2015, these adjustment amounts were negligible. In 2011, these adjustments 
amounts were larger. Therefore, in some cases, the implementation data analyzed in this 
thesis differ slightly from those previously reported and studied by the GAO (GAO 2012a; 
GAO 2013), where their budget data was obtained in 2011. GAO reports were published 
with the best budget data available at the time; this thesis uses better quality 2005 BRAC 
budget data from 2015.  
D. DESCRIPTION OF SELECTED DATA 
This thesis analyzes 58 observations of BRAC 2005 actions and the associated data 
relating to each action’s estimated and actual implementation costs. Criteria for inclusion 
are actions estimated to cost more than $25 million. Criteria for exclusion are actions 
predominantly centered on Reserve Component transformation, classified actions where 
budget data is unavailable, and actions with inconsistent accounting methods for budget 
obligations. The resulting selected data set includes BRAC actions from every DoD 
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recommending agency except Intelligence, and one action added by the BRAC 
Commission.  
1. Explanations of Excluded Data 
The thesis data set was selected to reflect a representative sample for a future BRAC 
round that could provide meaningful insight into cost growth. Many 2005 BRAC actions 
were estimated to cost a relatively low amount to implement. For the 175 distinct BRAC 
2005 actions that became law, the actions’ cost estimates ranged from $0.10 million to 
$3,946 million. The overwhelming majority, 97.1%, of estimated implementation costs 
were captured in actions that were estimated to cost more than $25 million. Actions that 
were estimated to be less expensive had relatively little bearing on the ultimate 
implementation cost. In order to preserve the thesis focus on cost growth, 67 BRAC actions 
that cost $25 million or less are excluded from analysis.  
The 43 actions concerning the Reserve Component are excluded. The largescale 
transformation of the Reserve Component during BRAC 2005 is unique among historic 
BRAC rounds, and it is unlikely that the Reserve Component will feature heavily in the 
next BRAC round.  
Two BRAC actions are excluded because their data is classified.  
Five actions are excluded because their budget data is inconsistently recorded.  
In summary, of the 175 possible BRAC actions to consider, 67 were excluded 
because their contribution to cost is relatively minor, 43 were excluded because they 
concerned the Reserve Component, two were excluded because they were classified, and 
five were excluded because data was incomplete. The excluded data categories and their 
respective portions of the total estimated implementation cost are summarized in Table 2. 
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Table 2. BRAC Actions Excluded from Thesis Analysis 






Estimated to Cost <$25M 67 2.9% 
Reserve Component 43 16.1% 
Classified 2 6.0% 
Inconsistent Data  5 2.3% 
 
The resulting data for analysis in this thesis is thus aligned with what may be 
expected in the next BRAC round. The thesis data comprises 58 observations that capture 
74% of the estimated implementation cost for BRAC 2005. 
2. Explanation of Variables in Estimated Cost Data 
Cost estimation data is obtained from the “Total One-Time Cost Report” generated 
by each BRAC action’s respective COBRA model. Each report outputs thirty-one numeric 
variables that represent estimated costs for a particular category. Their values are the total 
one-time implementation costs estimated to be incurred during the six-year implementation 
period, for each cost category. These estimated costs are reported in 2005-year dollars. A 
description of the categories of estimated costs are summarized in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Description of Estimated Costs Produced by COBRA 
Estimated Cost Variable 
(as displayed in COBRA) 
Description of Estimated Cost Variable  
 
MILCON Military Construction Costs 
Civ RIF Civilian Reduction in Force (RIF) Costs  
Civ Retire Civilian Retirement Costs 
Per Diem Civilian Per Diem Costs 
POV Miles 
Civilian Personally Owned Vehicle Management 
Costs 
Home Purch Civilian House Purchasing Costs 
HHG Civilian Household Goods Costs 
Misc Civilian Miscellaneous Moving Costs 
House Hunt Civilian House Hunting Costs 
PPP Civilian Priority Placement Service Costs 
RITA 
 
Civilian Relocation Income Tax Allowance (RITA) 
Costs 
Packing Packing/Unpacking Costs 
Freight Freight Shipping Costs 
Vehicles Vehicle Shipping Costs 
Unemployment Civilian Unemployment Costs  
Info Tech Information Technology Costs 
Prog Manage Program Management Costs 
Supt Contra Support Contract Costs 
Mothball Mothball Costs 
1-Time Move One-Time Moving Costs 
MIL MOVING Per Diem Military Per Diem Costs 
MIL MOVING POV Miles Military Personally Owned Vehicle Mileage Costs 
MIL MOVING HHG Military Household Goods Costs 
MIL MOVING Misc Military Miscellaneous Moving Out Costs 
Elim PCS Military Eliminated PCS Costs 
HAP/RSE 
 
Homeowners Assistance Program/ Relocation Service 
Entitlement Costs 
Environmental Environmental Non-Military Construction Costs 
Misc Contract Mission Contract Costs 
1-Time Other One-Time Other Costs 
Total_Onetime 
 





The estimation dataset also incorporates qualitative cost data from the 2005 BRAC 
Commission’s Final Report. These variables are described in Table 4.  
Table 4. Qualitative Variables in Estimation Cost Data 
Estimated Cost Variable Description of Estimated Cost Variable 
Sponsoring Agency The DoD agency that recommended the BRAC action 
Commission Fully 
Approved 
A factor value indicating whether or not the Commission 
found the recommendation “consistent with the final selection 
and force structure plan” (Defense Base Closure and 
Realignment Commission 2005), as described in the 
“Commission Recommendations” section of its final report. 
Variable levels are “A” if fully approved, “P” if approved in 
part. 
 
3. Introduced Estimation Variables 
In response to GAO research suggesting that bundled BRAC actions involving 
more than one base may be more opaque than standalone actions and perhaps subject to 
more variability in cost growth, two variables assessing complexity are added to the 
estimation data. The data for these proxy variables of BRAC action complexity are 
obtained from the “MilconAs” report from each action’s respective COBRA model. The 
Number of Bases variable counts the number of distinct bases or locations that were 
expected to be involved in a particular BRAC action. The Non-Zero Milcon Bases variable 
counts the number of distinct bases or locations that were estimated to require military 
construction costs, no matter how large. Descriptions of the introduced estimation variables 
are summarized in Table 5. 
Table 5. Proxy Variables for BRAC Action Complexity 
Estimated Cost Variable Description of Estimated Cost Variable 
Number of Bases  Count of distinct bases or locations involved in a particular 
BRAC action 
Non-Zero Milcon Bases Count of distinct bases or locations involved in a particular 
BRAC action that carry a military construction requirement 
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4. Data Variables for Implementation Costs 
The cost variables in the Business Plans capture the total implementation costs that 
were incurred over the six-year implementation period. Each cost category records its 
respective budgetary obligation that was required for implementation in constant 2005-
year dollars. In the Business Plan source data, each of these cost variables are broken up 
into two subcategories: implementation costs incurred within the BRAC account and 
implementation costs incurred outside the BRAC account. The implementation costs used 
in this thesis are the sum of the implementation costs across cost subcategories in both the 
BRAC account and outside the BRAC account. This treatment is chosen because cost 
accounting inside and outside the BRAC accounts is inconsistent across services, per GAO 
reporting. Costs outside the BRAC account are also relatively small. Only 2.9% of the 
BRAC 2005’s total implementation costs were obligated with funds outside of the BRAC 
account. The implementation data variables are show in Table 6.  
Table 6. Description of Implemented Costs Recorded in Business 
Plans 
Implementation Cost Variable  Description of Implementation Cost Variable  
BP_ MILCON Military Construction costs  
BP_ O&M  Operations & Maintenance (O&M) costs  
BP_ Environmental  Environmental costs  
BP_ MilPers Military Personnel Permanent Change of Station (PCS) costs  
BP_ HAP Homeowners Assistance Program costs  
BP_ Other Other costs  
BP_GrandTotal Grand Total of Implementation costs 
 
5. Introduced Implementation Variables 
Estimation costs and implementation (business plans) costs are not recorded with 
the same subcategories, which presents a challenge for direct comparison by subcategory. 
There are more estimation cost categories than there are implementation cost categories. 
In order to compare costs between the estimated and implemented data, appropriate 
COBRA estimated cost variables are summed together to introduce variables that may be 
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compared directly with Business Plan implementation data. These introduced variables are 
summarized in the crosswalk shown in Table 7. 
Table 7. Crosswalk of Introduced Variables 
Introduced Cost 
Estimation Variable 
Cost Estimation Variables 
Summed (from COBRA 
model) 
Corresponding Implementation 
Cost Variable  
c_environ Environmental BP_environmental 
c_milpers MIL MOVING Per Diem 
MIL MOVING POV Miles 
MIL MOVING HHG 
MIL MOVING Misc 
Elim PCS 
BP_milpers 





















c_milcon milcon BP_Milcon 
c_HAP Other HAP/RSE BP_HAP 






To produce a measure for evaluating the cost increases specific to individual BRAC 
actions, variables that calculate the percentage cost increase from the cost estimate to the 
implementation cost are also introduced. These variables are produced for each available 
subcategory and summarized in Table 8. Cost growth is represented as a percentage and is 
calculated by dividing the difference in implementation cost minus estimation cost by the 
estimation cost. 
Table 8. Introduced Variables to Measure Cost Growth 
Introduced Cost Increase 
Variable 
Description of variable 
Milcon Increase The percentage growth in military construction cost  
O&M Increase The percentage growth in O&M cost 
Environmental Increase The percentage growth in Environmental cost 
Other Increase The percentage growth in Other costs 
Total increase The percentage growth in Total Cost 
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IV. COST GROWTH TRENDS AND ANALYSIS 
This section displays trends in the cost growth from estimated implementation costs 
to actual implementation costs. All analysis presented here uses the thesis data set of 58 
selected BRAC 2005 observations.  
A. COST GROWTH BY SUBCATEGORY 
Consistent with GAO findings, a comparison of estimated cost with implemented 
cost highlights that military construction experienced the most significant cost increase 
among cost subcategories. Operations and Maintenance (O&M) costs also increased 
significantly, while costs categorized as “Other” decrease. Figure 1 illustrates the cost 
increase for each category from estimated cost to implemented cost. 
 
Figure 1. BRAC 2005 Cost Growth among Cost Subcategories 
Notably, the overwhelming majority of implementation costs were incurred in just 
three categories: military construction, operations and maintenance, and other. 
Homeowners Assistance Program (HAP) costs, environmental costs, and military 
personnel costs are comparatively small. HAP costs are negligible. These costs are shown 
in greater detail in Figure 2, measured in thousands of 2005 dollars. 
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Figure 2. BRAC 2005 Cost Increases for HAP, Environmental, and 
MilPers 
B. TRENDS IN COST GROWTH AMONG INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS 
The following visualizations go beyond the aggregate cost increases and examine 
the trends in cost growth exhibited by individual BRAC actions.  
1. Implementation Cost Growth 
Analysis of the set of BRAC actions shows that individual BRAC actions also 
tended to increase in cost, in addition to the observation that the aggregate BRAC 
implementation cost grew significantly. The total implementation cost increased in 43 of 
the 58 observations for BRAC actions. Figure 3 plots these estimated versus implemented 
one-time costs. The red diagonal line represents a case of a “perfect” cost estimation, where 
an estimated cost equals the implementation cost.  
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Figure 3. Estimated versus Implemented One-Time Costs 
Actions that increased in cost are shown above the red line; actions that decreased 
in cost are below the red line. Figure 3 shows that the preponderance of observations 
represent cost increases. To highlight this point, Figure 4 shows the same graph in greater 
detail with the three most expensive observations omitted. Figure 4 omits BRAC Actions 
No. 10, 169, and 172.  
 
Figure 4. Subset of Estimated versus Implemented One-Time Costs 
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2. Military Construction Cost Growth 
The majority of BRAC actions’ military construction estimates experienced cost 
growth. Of the 58 BRAC actions, 52 experienced increases in military construction costs. 
Figure 5 displays the cost relationship between the estimated and implemented military 
construction costs.  
 
Figure 5. MILCON: Estimated versus Implemented One-Time Costs 
To show the cost growth trends clearly for the observations that are tightly grouped 
in Figure 5, Figure 6 zooms in on a subset representing 52 observations, eliminating 6 
extreme observations. Figure 6 omits BRAC Actions No. 10, 169, 172, 9, 133, and 121. 
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Figure 6. MILCON: Subset of Estimated versus Implemented One-
Time Costs 
3. Operations and Maintenance Cost Growth 
O&M costs also increased in a majority of BRAC actions. Figures 7 and 8 display 
the cost relationship between estimated and implemented O&M costs and a subset of O&M 
costs, respectively. The subset is selected to show the tightly grouped observations in 
greater detail. In Figure 8, the removed extreme observations are BRAC Actions No. 169, 
172, and 145. O&M costs increased in 47 of the 58 observations. 
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Figure 7. O&M: Estimated versus Implemented One-Time Costs 
 
Figure 8. O&M: Subset of Estimated versus Implemented One-Time 
Costs 
4. Other-Category Cost Growth 
Cost categorized as “Other” is the only major subcategory of one-time 
implementation costs that did not experience a general increase. Figures 9 and 10 display 
the cost relationship between estimated and implemented Other-category costs with all 58 
observations and a subset eliminating extreme observations, respectively. Figure 10 
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eliminates BRAC Actions No. 10, 172, 133, 6, 169, 9, and 7. The preponderance of other-
category costs decreased at implementation. 
 
Figure 9. Other: Estimated versus Implemented One-Time Costs 
 
Figure 10. Other: Subset of Estimated versus Implemented One-Time 
Costs 
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C. EXPLORATION OF POSSIBLE COST INFLATION FACTORS 
Cost inflation factors that inflate estimates at a certain multiple in order to arrive at 
a more accurate cost may be an effective way to predict implementation cost. As a simple 
example, the GAO’s reported finding of a 67% cost increase in 2005 BRAC 
implementation cost may inform the use of a flat inflation factor of 167% of the estimated 
cost, assuming comparable future conditions. Continuing this example, a future BRAC 
round estimated to cost $10 billion could thus be expected to cost $16.7 billion. 
The section explores that data to see if there are ways in which the data may be 
categorized into subsets where implementation cost increases are markedly different from 
other subsets. Where such differences exist, this may justify applying unique cost inflation 
factors to the estimates in the subsets in order to enhance the predictive quality of the 
estimates. Mean cost increases and variation in cost increases are evaluated for various data 
subsets.  
1. Note on Methodology and Model of Analysis 
As applies to the analysis throughout this thesis, the value of using cost inflation 
factors is dependent on the extent to which future BRAC rounds may be comparable to 
BRAC 2005. Even if suitable cost inflation factors are discovered to describe 2005 data, it 
would only be appropriate to apply these cost inflation factors for future BRAC rounds if 
the natures of those BRAC rounds were similar to BRAC 2005. 
This section’s analysis also merits a clarification of what is the sample and what is 
the population. In this analysis, the 58 BRAC 2005 observations under study are considered 
to be a sample of a larger, hypothetical set of 2005 BRAC observations that could have 
been expected if additional BRAC actions of a similar nature occurred in 2005. Thus, the 
sample is the 58 observations, and the population is a theoretical set of similarly-produced 
observations. This approach is necessary in order to do t-tests and ANOVA that compare 
the mean cost increases of different types of BRAC actions, for which, if statistically 
significant, may justify the use of distinct inflation factors for cost increases.  
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2. Recommending Agency Trends 
This section evaluates speculation on whether one military service or DoD 
recommending agency produces more accurate cost estimates than another.  
Every recommending agency except Intelligence is represented in the selected data 
for this thesis. One BRAC action added by the BRAC Commission is also included. The 
number of actions for each DoD recommending agency in the selected data is shown in 
Table 9. 
Table 9. Selected Data: BRAC Actions by DoD Recommender 
DoD Recommender Number of BRAC actions (n) 
Army  8 
Department of Navy (DoN)  5 
Air Force  7 
Education & Training (E&T)  4 
Headquarters & Support Activities (H&SA) 16 
Industrial  7 
Medical  4 
Supply & Storage (S&S)  2 
Technical  4 
Added by BRAC Commission (ADD)  1 
Total 58 
 
Figure 11 displays a box plot distribution of cost growth for each recommending 
agency. The mean percentage cost increase for each DoD recommending agency is shown 
in red.  
40 
 
Figure 11. Implementation Cost Growth for BRAC Actions by DoD 
Recommending Agency 
Cost growth varies among DoD recommending agencies. However, the number of 
observations for each recommending agency is small, and the differences among their 
mean cost increases are not statistically significant. In addition to the visual indication in 
Figure 11, a lack of statistical significance is supported by a one-way ANOVA test for 
equality of all means.  
𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜: 𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 =  𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝑜𝑜𝐷𝐷 = 𝜇𝜇𝐸𝐸&𝑇𝑇 =  𝜇𝜇𝐻𝐻&𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 =  𝜇𝜇𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 =  𝜇𝜇𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷 = 𝜇𝜇𝑆𝑆&𝑆𝑆 =  𝜇𝜇𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻 = 𝜇𝜇𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈  
The one-way ANOVA test of this hypothesis results in a p-value of 0.149. This p-
value fails to reject the null hypothesis at α = 0.05, and we must allow for the possibility 
that the mean cost increases of BRAC actions may not be different across recommending 
agencies. These findings do not support the use of distinct cost inflation factors for DoD 




Some 2005 BRAC actions were amended immediately prior to their 
implementation. When the 2005 BRAC Commission reviewed and approved the DoD’s 
2005 BRAC recommendations, the Commission approved 119 BRAC action 
recommendations exactly as they were originally submitted by the DoD, and 45 DoD 
BRAC action recommendations were approved with amendments by the Commission. Of 
the 58 observations this thesis analyzes, 24 were amended. 
It is reasonable to speculate whether amendments had an impact on implementation 
cost growth. 2005 BRAC actions’ estimates were generally not based on the amended 
version of the recommendation; rather, they were based on the original recommendation. 
Even for amended BRAC actions where the BRACO and military services had an 
opportunity to revise COBRA model estimates to reflect the Commission’s amendments, 
these updates may have been cursory due to the time constraint of the approaching 
implementation period. Thus, they may have put forward an estimate that did not resemble 
what was finally approved. For these reasons, one might expect amended BRAC actions to 
have more variability in cost growth. On the other hand, the presence of specified 
amendments resulting from Commission scrutiny may have signaled tighter constraints for 
amended BRAC actions, either directly through specifically enumerated changes or 
implicitly. If such were the case, one may expect amended BRAC actions to have less 
variability in cost growth than BRAC actions that were not amended.  
Evaluation of this conjecture finds that the mean cost growth of amended 2005 
BRAC actions and non-amended 2005 BRAC actions are not dissimilar. A two-sample t-
test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the mean cost increase in non-amended BRAC 
actions is equal to the mean cost increase in amended BRAC actions at a p-value of 0.469.  
𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜: 𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠′𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴 = 𝜇𝜇𝐷𝐷𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴−𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠′𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴  
The mean cost increase for amended actions is 32.5% and 59.2% for non-amended actions, 
but the difference is not statistically significant. 
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However, in evaluating the relative uncertainty in cost growth, amended actions 
show less variation in their cost increases than non-amended actions, as the box plot in 
Figure 12 shows. 
 
Figure 12. Implementation Cost Growth for Amended and Non-
amended BRAC Actions 
4. Complexity 
The introduced variable, NumberOfBases, is a proxy variable for complexity; it is 
the count of distinct bases that a 2005 BRAC action was expected to involve. Some 
complex BRAC actions involved several bases whereas simpler BRAC actions involved 
few bases. Figure 13 shows that the median cost increase is similar among more complex 
and less complex BRAC actions. “Fewer Bases” are BRAC action observations that were 
estimated to involve 1–6 distinct bases (n=27). “More Bases” describes BRAC action 
observations that were estimated to have 7–22 bases (n=28).  
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Three observations (BRAC Actions No. 146, 143, and 155) were excluded because the 
number of bases involved in the action could not be determined.  
Figure 13. Box Plot of Cost Growth by Action Complexity 
The closer quantiles in BRAC actions with more bases indicate that there may be 
less variation in cost increases among complex BRAC actions. However, this may simply 
be the default effect of reduced variation when multiple entities with individual 
uncertainties are grouped, similar to how diversification of several stocks in an investment 
portfolio prevents a portfolio from going up or down as drastically as would a portfolio 
with one or few stocks. While this difference in variation is visually noticeable, it is not 
statistically significant. This finding does not support the use of cost inflation factors on 
this basis of BRAC action complexity, as measured by the proxy variable, NumberOfBases. 
5. Size of Estimated Cost 
The variation in implementation cost increases is similar for low and high cost 
estimates. Figure 14 shows the distribution of implementation cost increases for 2005 
BRAC actions divided into two equal groups: the half that are the more costly BRAC action 
estimates (high estimates) and the other half that comprise the comparatively less costly 
BRAC action estimates (low estimates).  
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Figure 14. Comparison of Variation in Implementation Cost Growth 
for Low versus High Estimates 
The distribution of the two groups’ cost increases shows that they nearly overlap. 
In addition to the visual indication, the lack of statistical significance is supported by the 
results of a t-test for equality of mean implementation cost increase between the two 
groups.  
𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜: 𝜇𝜇𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙_𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 =  𝜇𝜇ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖ℎ_𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 
The t-test for this hypothesis results in a p-value of 0.149, which fails to reject the null 
hypothesis at α = 0.05. This finding does not support the use of distinct cost inflation factors 
for estimates based on the size of the estimate because there is no significant difference 
between the two groups. 
Despite this finding, the thick right-side tail for low estimates is a notable 
observation. The thick tail suggests that significant cost increases in excess of 300% or 
400% cost growth are more common for lower estimated BRAC actions than higher 
estimates. 
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V. BIAS IN ESTIMATING LARGE BRAC ACTIONS 
Analysis of ex post facto groupings for differences in cost increases cannot alone 
inform better cost estimates, but it may signal where biases or limitations exist during the 
estimation phase. This analysis presents a conspicuous finding that there may be a systemic 
hesitancy to fully or accurately estimate the costliest BRAC actions to be as expensive as 
they ultimately end up costing.  
Figure 15 shows the distribution of implementation cost increases for BRAC 
actions for two groups after the six-year implementation period is complete and all 
implementation costs are realized and definitively known. The two equal-sized groups in 
Figure 15 are the actions that comprise the less costly BRAC actions upon implementation 
(actions with lower implementation costs) and the costlier half of BRAC actions. 
 
Figure 15. Comparison of Variation in Implementation Cost Growth 
for Lower versus Higher Implemented Costs 
Figure 15 illustrates a noticeable gap in the mean cost increases and variations in 
cost increases. BRAC actions that are ultimately less expensive exhibit less cost growth, 
whereas BRAC actions that are ultimately more expensive exhibit more cost growth. This 
analysis shows that some BRAC actions’ implementation costs will experience 
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significantly more cost growth than others, though it is indiscernible which actions these 
will be at the time of estimation.  
This finding suggests that there is a systematic bias against very large BRAC 
estimates. The GAO reports that such biases occur often in estimating program costs (GAO 
2009). Theses biases “may be cognitive—often based on the estimators’ inexperience—or 
motivational, where management intentionally reduces the estimate or shortens the 
schedule to make the project look good to stakeholders” (GAO 2009, p. 153). 
Promoting awareness of this issue among BRAC planners and stakeholders may be 
a first start in reducing its adverse impact on accurate cost estimates. BRAC estimators 
must be encouraged to produce realistic estimates if accurate estimates are expected, and 
stakeholders should be tolerant of high estimates. The analysis suggests that there will be 
very costly BRAC actions regardless of whether they are estimated to be so costly. A 
transparent understanding of this may produce greater comfort with high estimates.  
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VI. ESTIMATING FUTURE BRAC ROUNDS 
Decision makers deserve an understanding of the uncertainty in BRAC action cost 
estimates. This section quantifies the uncertainty in BRAC actions’ one-time cost estimates 
and delivers an improvement over the historic single-point estimate.  
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS  
Uncertainty is inherent in cost estimates because they predict the future. At the time 
when BRAC estimates are produced, fewer details are known about requirements and the 
chance of change is greater. As a BRAC round matures toward implementation, more is 
learned and the uncertainty surrounding its cost narrows. The GAO’s Cost Estimating and 
Assessment Guide describes that programs typically also increase in cost while reducing 
variance, because more requirements are added as the program is better understood (GAO 
2009). Adapted from GAO’s guide, Figure 16 shows a typical progression in uncertainty 
surrounding cost estimates, where the uncertainty is widest at the time of estimation and 
narrower near implementation.  
 
Figure 16. Cost Uncertainty Narrows over Acquisition Cycle. Adapted 
from GAO (2009). 
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Historic BRAC rounds have relied on single point estimates for implementation 
cost; BRAC 2005 was estimated to cost $21.0 billion to implement. Yet a point estimate 
by itself is insufficient. Point estimates merely provide a value chosen as “most likely” and 
do not provide any information about the inherent uncertainty.  
The point estimates for BRAC action implementation costs produced by the 
COBRA model also contain a great deal of uncertainty. A COBRA model estimate is 
composed from a sum of lower-level elements’ estimates, each of which comes with its 
own source of error. The GAO comments further on the flaws of summing lower-level 
elements, stating that “it is inaccurate to add up the most likely [Work Breakdown 
Structure] elements to derive a program cost estimate, since their sum is not usually the 
most likely estimate for the total program, even if they are estimated without bias” (GAO 
2009, p. 153). 
B. CONFIDENCE INTERVALS FOR BRAC ACTION COST INCREASES 
The preferable alternative to a single-point estimate is a confidence interval which 
provides a range of cost possibilities based on specified probability levels.  
The distribution of BRAC actions implementation cost increases provides a means 
of understanding future BRAC action costs increases. The observations selected in this 
thesis are chosen to represent what the DoD may realistically expect in a future BRAC 
round. Provided that a future BRAC round is similar to BRAC 2005 in its estimation and 
implementation practices, the following analysis may be applicable to decision makers’ 
understanding of BRAC actions’ implementation cost increases, and thus, their final, 
expected cost upon implementation.  
1. Variation in Implementation Cost Growth 
Implementation cost growth varies widely among 2005 BRAC actions. The fifty-
eight observations studied in this thesis have implementation cost increases that range from 
–100%, a BRAC action implementation that cost half of what was estimated, to 489%, a 
BRAC action that increased to nearly five times as much as its estimate. The histogram in 
Figure 17 shows the distribution of BRAC action cost increases among the 58 actions. 
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Figure 17. Histogram of Implementation Growth for Selected 2005 
BRAC Actions 
Selected 2005 BRAC actions’ implementation cost increases are non-normal and 
have a right-skewed distribution. The mean for these cost increases is 93.1%, the median 
is 63.7%, and the standard deviation is 135.9%. 
2. Three-Point Estimates at Various Confidence Intervals 
If we assume that future BRAC actions will resemble the 2005 BRAC actions 
studied in this thesis, we may make several inferences from this distribution. This analysis 
indicates that we may expect the average future BRAC action to increase 93.1% from its 
estimate.  Using confidence intervals, the distribution in Figure 17 also enables a three-
point estimate of the population mean of future, hypothetical BRAC action increases. 





The degrees of freedom, n - 1, is 57, the standard deviation, s, is 135.9 percent, and 
sample mean, ?̅?𝑥, is 93.1 percent. For a 95 percent confidence interval of a 2-tailed 
distribution, t*57 is 2.0025. For a 90 percent confidence interval of a 2-tailed distribution, 
t*57 = 1.6720, and for an 80 percent confidence interval of a 2-tailed distribution, t*57 = 
1.297. 
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Table 10 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the mean of implementation cost 
increases at various confidence intervals. 
Table 10. Estimates for Mean BRAC Action Implementation Cost 
Growth at 95-, 90-, and 80-Percent Confidence Intervals 
Confidence Interval Mean (%) Lower Bound (%) Upper Bound (%) 
95 percent 93.1 57.4 128.8 
90 percent 93.1 63.3 122.9 
80 percent 93.1 69.9 116.2 
 
The confidence intervals contain a wide range of cost increase possibilities. 
However, it is notable that none of the confidence intervals approach the inclusion of a 0% 
cost increase, which represents an accurate cost estimate. The model expects, with high 
confidence, that estimates will be overrun. In fact, the confidence interval for this set of 58 
observations would have to extend to a 99.9997% confidence interval before a 0% mean 
cost increase could be included as a possibility for the true mean of BRAC action cost 
increases.  
C. S-CURVE FOR FUTURE BRAC ACTIONS 
The probability distribution shown in Figure 17 delivers additional utility to 
decision makers in the form of an S-curve. An S-curve illustrates the cumulative 
probability distribution.  
The S-curve in Figure 18 is derived from the actual distribution of selected 2005 
BRAC action increases, where each BRAC action is assigned an equal probability of 1/
58th. It provides future BRAC decision makers with an estimate of the probability that a 
BRAC action’s implementation cost increase will be at some value or lower. Conversely, 
1 minus the associated probability is the probability that the BRAC action’s cost growth 




Figure 18. S-Curve for Probability of BRAC Action Cost Growth 
Using the S-curve, a BRAC action with an estimated implementation cost of $100 
million has a 50% probability that its cost will increase no more than 63%, corresponding 
to an implementation cost no greater than $163 million. The same $100 million estimate 
also has a 30% chance that its cost will increase more than 130%, which represents an 
implementation cost of at least $230 million.  
BRAC cost estimators may use this uncertainty analysis to inform stakeholders 
about future BRAC actions’ range of costs. Decision makers may then decide whether the 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The implementation of BRAC 2005 cost much more than originally expected, 
growing from $21.0 to $35.1 billion. This thesis delivers an understanding of the 
uncertainty in BRAC action estimates to aid future BRAC planners and decision makers.  
(1) Milcon Drives Cost Growth 
The most significant source of cost growth in BRAC 2005 was military 
construction, much of which was driven by additional requirements. Operations & 
maintenance costs also contributed to cost growth. HAP, environmental, and military 
personnel costs are not a significant source of cost growth in BRAC 2005 implementation 
cost. 
(2) Distinct Cost Inflation Factors Not Supported 
We conclude that it is not appropriate to apply distinct cost inflation factors to 
subsets of data to achieve more accurate cost estimates. No distinct differences are found 
in the studied BRAC actions’ cost increases when examined in several ways. There is no 
statistically significant difference in cost increases explained by the type of DoD 
recommending agency, the presence of Commission amendments, the degree of action 
complexity, or size of the cost estimate. Variation in implementation cost growth is mildly 
narrower for BRAC actions that were amended by the Commission and that were more 
complex. 
(3) Bias Detected in Estimating Large BRAC Actions 
In general, the BRAC actions that ultimately cost the most to implement experience 
the most cost growth. This systematic bias goes undetected at the time of estimation but 
becomes apparent when implementation is complete. This suggests an inability or 
hesitancy to fully estimate expensive BRAC actions. The bias may have cognitive or 
motivational origins. Awareness of its existence may prompt BRAC estimators to produce 
realistic estimates and prompt decision makers to be tolerant of higher estimates. 
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(4) Three-Point Estimate for Future BRAC Actions 
Future BRAC actions’ cost increases are informed by the distribution of selected 
2005 BRAC actions’ implementation cost increases. With 95% confidence, the true mean 
for BRAC actions’ implementation cost increases lies between a 57.4% cost increase and 
128.8% cost increase, with a mean of 93.1%. The cumulative distribution S-Curve 
produced in this thesis maps cost increases with their probability of occurrence. Decision 
makers may use this S-Curve to understand the potential range of costs for a BRAC action 
implementation.  
(5) Refined Data Collection Will Support Future Analysis 
The GAO correctly identifies that the practice of bundling several base realignment 
and closure actions within one recommendation severely limits detailed understanding of 
cost growth. Treating each base realignment or closure separately, or at a minimum, 
itemizing each under a larger recommendation, will greatly enhance data quality for future 
analysis. Historically, that level of granularity is lost as costs are recorded in aggregate. 
Budget costs should also be recorded in the same categories in which they are estimated 
by the COBRA model to enable a direct estimate-to-implementation comparison.  
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